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INTRODUCTION: PATENT REMEDIES IN THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE 
 
Jorge L. Contreras and Martin Husovec 
 
 
Despite their outward differences, all modern legal systems share a number of fundamental 
features. One of these features is the availability of legally enforceable remedies for injuries that 
are proven to an adequate legal standard.  As explained by Douglas Laycock, one of the preeminent 
scholars of common law remedies, “The choice of remedy and the measure and administration of 
the remedy chosen pose a distinctive set of questions -- logically separate from the liability 
determination and usually considered subsequent to that determination -- focused on what the court 
will do to correct or prevent the violation of legal rights that gives rise to liability.”1 
 
The law recognizes a wide array of remedies, both civil and criminal, ranging from 
monetary damages and fines to orders constraining future conduct to imprisonment.2 A legal 
system, embodied by the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, selects legal 
remedies for particular types of harms based on a range of considerations including compensating 
the injured party, punishing the injuring party, constraining future conduct by the injuring party, 
and deterring future injurious conduct by others. It is seldom the case that all available remedies 
are imposed for a single injurious act, but remedies issues in combination are not at all uncommon. 
 
Like most other areas of the law, patent law offers remedies to injured parties – those whose 
validly-issued patents are infringed by others.  Broadly speaking, remedies in patent law fall into 
two categories – damages, calculated by a variety of measures, and injunctions, which legally 
restrain the infringer’s future conduct.  It is not obvious, as a purely logical matter, which of these 
remedies is preferable in a given situation, or as a general matter.  Each has its purposes and can 
shape individual behavior as well as broader societal incentives and deterrents.  This being said, 
injunctive relief is highly valued by patent holders, sometimes far surpassing the perceived value 
of monetary remedies. 
 
Over the years, different jurisdictions have emphasized one form of remedy over another  
based on the internal structure of their laws, the position that patents occupy within that structure, 
and the role that judges, lawyers and political bodies play in making legal determinations. In some 
jurisdictions, patent law has a manifestly instrumental purpose.  For example, patents are 
authorized under the U.S. Constitution for the express instrumental purpose of promoting the 
progress of science and the useful arts (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8). In other jurisdictions, 
patents are regarded as property rights inherent to individual acts of invention. As a result of 
differences like these, there is a diversity of approaches to injunctive relief in patent cases.3 One 
 
1 Laycock 2008, 164. 
2 Criminal penalties for commercial activities should not be underestimated.  In the United States, at least, criminal 
penalties are routinely imposed for antitrust law violations, copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation. 
3 See, e.g., Cotter, 2013; Sikorski 2019; Siebrasse et al. 2019. 
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aim of this book is thus to highlight the differences among jurisdictions in this regard, whether 
rooted in legal doctrine, broader institutional structures or social and professional norms. 
 
In no jurisdiction is the issuance of injunctions in patent cases a purely automatic process.  
Even the most rigid legal system recognizes the need for some degree of discretion or flexibility 
in this regard under certain circumstances.  Flexibility at the remedy stage of an action can help to 
alleviate inefficiencies otherwise caused by uniformity within the patent system.  That is, because 
patents extend a uniform term of protection, and uniform rights to enforce against infringers, to all 
patented inventions irrespective of their degree of innovation or usefulness, “society pays too much 
for numerous innovations that would have been created with less robust protection, while in other 
cases patent rights are less extensive than would be necessary to induce the creation of certain 
costly but socially desirable inventions.”4   
 
This is the problem of uniformity cost – when the law affords the same legal rights to all 
inventions, some are invariably protected too much and some are protected too little, resulting in 
a cost to society with respect to those inventions. But because it is impossible to tailor patent grants 
to the societal value of individual inventions, tailoring mechanisms that can be deployed in the 
area of remedies can help to address inefficiencies resulting from uniformity cost.5 However, as 
remedies cannot redefine the scope of patent rights by going beyond the baseline of protection set 
by the legislature, tailoring and flexibility of remedies are more likely to resolve situations when 
inventions are protected too much. 
 
Thus another goal of this book is to explore the degree to which different jurisdictions 
employ tools of flexibility and tailoring in the imposition of patent law injunctions. As with the 
decision to issue injunctions, this set of tools is highly subject to the doctrinal, structural and 
normative background of individual jurisdictions.  Hence, we observe a variety of approaches, 
both to the issuance of injunctions and the tailoring of injunctive remedies after the decision to 
issue them has been made. This variety also demonstrates varying degrees of institutional openness 
towards judicial reconciliation of fundamental trade-offs implicit in the patent system. 
 
It is not a goal of this book, however, to suggest that strict uniformity among jurisdictions 
is possible or even desirable.  Like other scholars who have considered the issue, we do not suggest 
that an international treaty or harmonization of legal regimes is a desirable or even feasible goal.6 
This book demonstrates that injunction practices are embedded in the institutional make-up of each 
jurisdiction, such that simple legal transplants would be inadequate to address perceived 
deficiencies in the practices of any given jurisdiction.  
 
 
4 Carroll 2007, 423. 
5 Id. at 425. See also Burk & Lemley 2009, 137-41 (referring to judicial flexibility in the issuance and tailoring 
of injunctions as a “policy lever” that can help to alleviate the inherent costs associated with the uniformity of legal 
protection in different industries). 
6 See Cotter 2015, 2 (“a treaty that goes into greater detail about when injunctions must or should be granted … 
would not be a good idea”). 
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Rather, we seek to elucidate existing flexibility mechanisms within the legal frameworks 
that have developed around the world, to identify their similarities and differences, their probable 
driving forces, and to analyze trends that may emerge as patent litigation becomes an increasingly 
global and interconnected enterprise.7 We hope that this comparative and analytical study will 
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7 See, e.g., Contreras 2019 (describing global litigation in the area of standard-essential patents). 




ISSUING AND TAILORING PATENT INJUNCTIONS – A CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL 
COMPARISON AND SYNTHESIS 
 
Jorge L. Contreras and Martin Husovec 
 
 
In the preceding chapters of this book, we have seen a variety of national approaches to the 
issuance of and tailoring of injunctive relief, characterized by a range of similarities and 
differences among jurisdictions. In this chapter, we synthesize the principal features of these 
different legal systems, provide an analytical framework for comparing them, and offer our 
observations about trends and the outlook for the future. 
 
I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT CASES – COMPARING MODALITIES OF 
FLEXIBILITY 
 
One can compare national approaches to the issuance and tailoring of injunctive relief at 
several levels: that of the formal doctrine governing injunctive relief, the norms and customs that 
guide its judiciary, and the overall structural features of the legal system.  The use of particular 
approaches within a jurisdiction varies based on whether the relief sought is preliminary or 
permanent.  We will thus discuss these separately below, and then offer some observations 
regarding the rationale for the divergence of approaches as between permanent and preliminary 
relief. 
 
When the courts consider injunctive relief, they typically assess a wide range of issues. In 
order to allow for cross-country comparison, we divide these issues into the following three 
categories:  
 
(1)  Adequacy - Is an injunction an appropriate remedy for the type of harm suffered by the 
plaintiff? 
 
(2)  Party interests – What is the balance of hardships as between the parties from having 
an injunction issue or not issue? 
 
(3)  Public interests – Will any important interests of third parties or the public be affected 
by the issuance of an injunction?8 
 
These three categories are considered differently (if at all) across jurisdictions, but also at 
various procedural stages within the same jurisdiction (preliminary injunctions, stays pending 
appeal and final or permanent injunctions). Table 1 below provides a brief overview of how the 
countries that we studied take these different factors into account at different stages of litigation. 
 
8 From a European perspective, the notion of ‘proportionality’ (see below) usually covers both balancing of 
party’s interests, as well as balancing the public interest against that of the patent holder. 
 








Minority All countries Majority 
Stays pending appeal 
 
Minority Majority Minority 
Final injunctions 
 
Minority Minority Minority 
 
 Below, we consider in greater detail the ways in which different jurisdictions approach the 
issuance and tailoring of injunctive relief at different stages of litigation. 
 
A. Issuance of Injunctions  
1. Permanent Injunctions 
 
a. The Discretion Spectrum and Conceptual Models 
 
With respect to the issuance of injunctive relief (i.e., the binary question whether or not an 
injunction should be issued), there are two fundamental legal conceptual models on which the 
countries studied base their practices: one in which injunctive relief is presumed to be available if 
a patent is infringed as a logical outgrowth of the nature of the exclusive patent right (“Injunction 
as a Right”), and another in which injunctive relief is evaluated for its appropriateness as one of 
several available remedies for patent infringement (including monetary damages) (“Injunction as 
a Remedy”). These two conceptual models generally exist within the boundaries of the two legal 
traditions studied here – civil law and common law. 
 
While courts in both groups might consider public and party interests, only common law 
countries appear to view the remedial adequacy or appropriateness of an injunction as a 
fundamental factor in deciding whether or not an injunction should be issued. Among the countries 
studied, the United States and the United Kingdom are the only two clearly following this model. 
Two other countries in the sample that follow at least some common law principles, Canada and 
Israel, find themselves somewhere  between the two legal traditions, less because of underlying 
doctrine than attitudes of their judiciaries. 
 
To further explore the richness of national approaches represented in this study, we have 
developed a spectrum that roughly charts the discretion available to judges and how they exercise 
it. It should be noted, however, that our classification is a snapshot from a particular period. As 
will be discussed in Section D, below, the emerging legal literature in many countries, along with 
cases and legislative changes, might cause countries to shift along our spectrum over time. In that 
sense, the spectrum is not static. 
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We describe five points along the spectrum as follows: 
 
A no to little discretion: automatic issuance upon a finding of infringement  [Germany,9 
France, Italy, Netherlands] 
 
B  discretion, but not used: automatic issuance upon a finding of infringement owing to 
attitudes of judges, despite the fact that that the law gives them some discretion 
[Finland, Poland] 
 
C discretion, rarely used: automatic issuance upon a finding of infringement owing to 
attitudes of judges, despite the fact that that the law gives them discretion, except for 
rare circumstances [Canada, Israel] 
 
D discretion, sometimes used: injunctions generally issue, but there is an individualized 
assessment in some cases [UK] 
 





The foregoing taxonomy is organized according to the remedial theory, and available 
domestic case-law concerning the issuance of permanent injunctions in patent cases.  Yet, for 
practical purposes, one could also view groups A and B, and partly C, as resembling one another.  
In these countries, injunctions are usually issued when patent infringement is found.  Despite the 
discretion that is afforded to judges in countries in groups B and C, this discretion is never or 
seldom exercised through a denial of an injunction. However, unlike countries in group A, this is 
a choice for judges in countries in groups B and C, not black letter law. 
 
9 At the time of writing, the German legislature is considering a change which might affect its future place in our 
taxonomy. See Part D, below. 
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 In countries in groups A to C, the default tendency toward the issuance of injunctions is 
strong, and is only overridden rarely (if ever). In countries in group D (comprising only the United 
Kingdom), the default is weaker and can be overridden more easily. And in group E countries 
(comprising only the United States), a case-by-case assessment is the default, though, as discussed 
below, individual judges may develop decisional shortcuts and heuristics to simplify the decision-
making process.  
 
 b. Discretionary Levers when Injunctions are Issued as of Right 
 
Even in countries that we classify as being in groups A, B, and C, having a strong 
presumption favoring the issuance of injunctions in patent cases, courts exhibit varying degrees of 
discretion.  
 
Not surprisingly, the least discretion is observed in group A.  There, courts generally take 
a strong view that permanent injunctions automatically follow a finding of infringement, and 
extremely limited discretion is afforded to override this presumption: Germany, France, Italy, and 
the Netherlands, represent this approach to varying degrees. The courts in these countries generally 
see no valid mechanism to balance the interests of the parties in making the injunction decision. 
As for the public interest, they often view it as sufficiently served by the existence of compulsory 
licensing schemes or other features of the patent system, as discussed below. If the public interest 
is at stake, but the defendant did not make use of the procedure for compulsory licensing, the view 
is that the judge should not try to correct this outcome through remedies. The Dutch courts go as 
far as to suggest that ‘the protection of the interests of third parties such as patients should not take 
place through allowing patent infringement’.10 
 
Although concepts like general civil law doctrines of abuse of rights and good faith are 
uniformly available in these countries, they are seldom used to limit the issuance of injunctions. 
Typically, the only abuse the judges are willing to rely on is one defined by competition law or at 
least strongly overlapping with competition law. For instance, Dutch courts treated problematic 
FRAND scenarios prior to the CJEU decision in Huawei v ZTE under the Dutch civil law doctrine 
of abuse of rights.  
 
Courts in B countries perceive injunctions to be discretionary by nature, but judges 
predominantly grant them without any significant case-by-case analysis. Finnish law invites judges 
to consider the issuance of injunctions on a case by case basis. Israeli law conceptualizes injunctive 
relief as discretionary in nature, and Polish law implicitly grants discretion as well. But despite 
this, the judges in these countries generally issue injunctions in patent cases on a more or less 
automatic basis.  
 
In the Finnish and Polish literature, it is widely understood that there might be exceptions 
to this general rule, usually based on the concept of abuse of rights or the principle of 
proportionality. In both countries, there is other IP case law (e.g., copyright and trademark) that 
applies such criteria more often. However, in patent law, no such cases exist to date.  
 
10 Boehringer Mannheim/Kirin Amgen (HR 1995, par. 3.7) - see discussion in Chapter 11 (Netherlands). 
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An important difference between group B and C countries is the extent of tailoring their 
judges are willing to undertake. Group C countries, despite being close to civil law countries on 
the automatic issuance of injunctions, pro-actively intervene in the tailoring of injunctions, as 
courts do in common law countries. However, on the issue of denial of injunctions, they remain 
largely hesitant.  
 
In Israel, there is a significant gap between the judiciary’s rigid approach to final 
injunctions and its broad inherent discretion.  
 
Canada is a special case. Its courts appear to be of the view that, while injunctions are 
discretionary, as they ‘normally follow’ a finding of infringement, and a permanent injunction will 
be refused only in ‘rare circumstances’. However, to date, Canadian courts only have had a single 
patent infringement case in which an injunction was denied.  In that case, the court cited local 
employment concerns, the fact that the patent was not practiced in Canada, and the patent was only 
used as a negotiation tool. To compensate, the judge awarded damages on ‘a generous, but non-
confiscatory’ rate, which was somewhat enhanced compared to reasonable royalties. Unlike U.S. 
or UK courts, however, Canadian courts have not allowed infringers to design around the patent 
by including stays in their final injunctions. For these reasons, we have included Canada among 
group C countries, while acknowledging that Canada might at some point shift toward group D. 
Today, however, Canadian case-law does not allow us to make such categorization, which might 
be caused by the relative scarcity of PAE litigation in Canada and the fact that Canadian cases 
involving tailoring of injunctions have typically involved direct competitors. 
 
Unlike group A, therefore, the law in B or C countries is less an obstacle to the loosening 
of the automatic issuance of injunctions. The obstacles in these countries are the traditional 
attitudes of judges, and perhaps a lack of appropriate cases. Although the same can be partly said 
about the group A countries, the theoretical availability of discretion is an important distinguishing 
factor.  
 
Philosophically, judges in group A countries often emphasize that the presumption 
favoring injunctions in patent cases follows from the idea that patent rights are property rights. It 
is an inherent right of a property owner to exclude others from the enjoyment of that property. This 
reasoning is explicitly found in a majority of civil law countries in our study (France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Germany).  
 
In France, injunctions do not have an explicit statutory basis, but the proprietary nature of 
patents is understood to provide an entitlement to such relief. And in Italy, an injunction issued by 
a court is often seen as equivalent to the prohibition on infringement already contained in the law, 
apart from the fact that it is addressed to a specific person. 
 
c. Judicial Discretion when Injunctions are Viewed and Practiced as Types of 
Remedies 
 
Courts in group D and E countries view permanent injunctions as one type of legal remedy 
that exists alongside other remedies such as compensatory damages, punitive damages, specific 
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performance, and so forth.  Given their roots in English common law, these countries generally 
view equitable remedies as appropriate if they are necessary to address harms that are otherwise 
inadequately redressed by “legal” remedies such as monetary compensation (i.e., deriving from 
the historical division between the courts of law and the ecclesiastical courts of equity). Unlike 
courts in group A countries, the adequacy of injunctive relief is an integral part of the court’s 
analysis of a party’s request for an injunction. The difference between groups D and E, then, is the 
degree to which courts view patent infringement as an irreparable harm as to which a permanent 
injunction is an appropriate remedy, though in many cases, especially in group D (the United 
Kingdom), this analysis may be brief or absent in any given case.   
 
As explained above, while injunctions may also be viewed as remedies in Canada or Israel, 
this view is less supplemented by actual practice. Although these countries differ from group D 
and E countries on the actual use of discretion, they typically engage in more tailoring than group 
A and B countries. In most of the common law countries that we studied (US, UK, Canada, Israel), 
judges are more proactive in drafting their injunction orders, and enjoy considerable discretion in 
doing so. 
 
Courts in the United Kingdom generally view patent infringement as causing irreparable 
harm to the patent holder, giving rise to a strong presumption of injunctive relief.  This view was 
also held in the United States prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange 
(2006).11  In eBay, however, the Supreme Court rejected the lower courts’ presumption of 
irreparable harm in patent cases, requiring instead that courts apply the “traditional equitable” four 
factor analysis when assessing the appropriateness of injunctive relief as a remedy in any given 
case.  As a result, injunctions are refused in a material number of patent infringement cases in the 
U.S., particularly those involving non-practicing entities.  In many of these cases, the court will 
award the patent holder ongoing monetary damages (a royalty) in lieu of the injunction. 
 
The four eBay factors, which are discussed at length in Chapter 14 (US), include irreparable 
harm, inadequacy of monetary remedies, a balance of hardships between the parties, and the public 
interest. Though not expressly codified to this degree in the UK or Canada, some of these principles 
do enter into judicial consideration of injunctive relief in these countries.  
 
In the United Kingdom, when a patentee has established infringement, an injunction will 
generally be granted. However, the case law demonstrates that judges can deny injunctions entirely 
(including an award damages in lieu of the injunction) or with respect to a part of the infringement; 
or they can stay enforcement of a permanent injunction for a limited period.  
 
In the United Kingdom, two notable cases concern partial grant of injunctions for a sub-set 
of infringements in order to protect health interests of impacted patients, and a two and half-week 
stay of an injunction to allow for redesign of widely used service by the infringer. It is worth noting 
that in the United Kingdom, many cases which otherwise would have to be argued on the public 
interest or balance of hardship grounds, were often resolved by prior agreement of the parties to 
the dispute, with the judges following the agreement of the parties.  
 
 
11  eBay (2006). 
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2. Stays pending appeal 
 
It is a typical feature of many systems that first instance decisions ordering injunctions can 
be subject to a stay pending appeal. The courts commonly recognize that such stays provide 
stronger evidence of infringement than preliminary injunctions stage. As a consequence, the 
counter-interests speaking against enforceability have to be stronger. The countries use different 
defaults: (a) no provisional enforcement, unless the right holder requests it (Italy and France in the 
past, the Netherlands), or (b) default immediate enforceability, unless the alleged infringer requests 
a stay (Italy and France today, Canada, United States, Finland, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom). 
In Poland, the first instance decision is never immediately enforceable.  
 
As illustrated by the Italian experience, the default rule may significantly influence 
outcomes. In the 1990s, the default rule in Italy was that non-final injunctions not be  provisionally 
enforced.  Italian courts openly exercised their discretion not to enforce such injunctions in favor 
of infringers. Their assumption was that the harm suffered by the infringer from an injunction 
subsequently lifted could be irreparable, while the patentee could always be compensated with 
damages. Once the default rule changed, the attitude of judges tilted in favor of provisional 
enforceability. The legislature’s choice of default thus influenced the attitude of judges. A similar 
change of default rules was adopted in France in 2019.  
 
The Netherlands, however, offers a contrary example. Although, by default, appeals 
suspend enforceability, and the Dutch Supreme Court has held that provisional enforceability is 
always subject to a balance of interests, in practice the Dutch courts virtually always allow 
provisional enforceability. In Canada, there is generally a presumption, albeit not too strong, 
against granting a stay pending appeal.  
 
Regardless of the default rule, injunctions pending appeal are subject to a separate 
balancing test even in leading civil law jurisdictions. Usually, the infringer has to post a financial 
guarantee to compensate the patent holder for potential damages caused by the stay. As illustrated 
by Dutch practice, judges can be reluctant to exercise such discretion. The balancing usually takes 
the form of a typical balance of convenience. That is, how much does the potential harm to the 
defendant outweigh the plaintiff’s interests (Germany, UK)? In the United States, judges can also 
consider the public interest as a factor in determining whether to grant a stay. Conditions of the 
financial guarantee, in particular its size, can also act as effective delays on the enforcement of 
injunctions. For instance, in a recent FRAND dispute between Nokia and Daimler,12 a German 
court set a bond at the unprecedented rate of 7bn euros. 
 
This brief summary shows that injunctive orders might produce binding effects at different 
points in time. In countries that grant preliminary injunctions, such orders come very early, but 
might be more limited in scope. In other countries, where preliminary injunctions are harder to 
obtain, patent holders need to await at least a first instance decision on the merits resulting in an 
injunction. Such injunctions could be more widely construed than preliminary injunctions and 
enforced provisionally; but there are also countries in which such injunctions are effectively 
 
12 See LG Manheim, Case 2 O 34/19, reported on at < http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/08/no-cjeu-reference-
yet-as-mannheim-court.html> 
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enforceable only once they become final. Lastly, some countries might offer de facto stays of 
enforceability during the enforcement stage.  
 
The models employed by different countries might therefore be hard to compare when it 
comes to temporal effects. A country whose judges decide cases very quickly and are willing to 
grant stays of final injunctions pending appeal might, at the end of the day, be less generous to 
infringers than a country whose procedures take much longer and offer numerous delays at the 
interim stages. 
 
In general, losing a preliminary injunction means that only a final injunction on the merits 
will produce any binding effects. Since the merits determination in some countries, such as Poland, 
might last years, this means that any infringer effectively enjoys a ‘stay’ during the pendency of 
the matter. It is therefore understandable that in Poland significant emphasis is put on preliminary 
injunctions, as these are the only effective injunctive orders for a considerable duration of the 
patent term.  
 
On the other hand, in countries where preliminary injunctions are rare, such as United 
States or Canada, the emphasis is on final injunctions, but these are sometimes provisionally 
enforceable, subject to different tests of balance of party interests. In Canada, judges can tailor 
their stays and temporarily permit part of the infringing activity. 
 
Finally, most of the European jurisdictions, with the exception of Poland, combine 
available preliminary injunctions with provisional enforceability of first instance merits decisions. 
In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Israel, stays might be hard to obtain for the 
infringers. One Israeli court was of the view that there is ordinarily no reason to grant a stay with 
respect to injunctions because a failure to enforce the injunction will only increase the plaintiff’s 
injury. However, they are willing to suspend seizure orders as these affect a defendant’s reputation, 
which cannot be ex-post compensated by damages, while plaintiff’s harm of a suspended seizure 
can be more easily compensated.  
 
3. Issuance of Preliminary Injunctions 
 
Unlike permanent injunctions, which are issued only after a finding of infringement, 
temporary or preliminary injunctive relief is issued during the course of a proceeding, when an 
infringement is alleged but not proven. No country in our study has adopted a strong presumption 
in favor of preliminary relief. Instead, as far as preliminary injunctions are concerned, courts in all 
countries adopt some form of discretionary procedure.  
 
Generally, the test for preliminary injunctions starts with a determination of the patent 
holder’s probability of success on merits. These standards differ considerably among countries. 
Some countries, such as the U.S., Germany and Finland, require that the patentee demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits before issuing a preliminary injunction (which we 
refer to as a “strong” proof requirement), while others, such as the UK, Canada, Israel and Poland, 
simply require the existence of a credible claim of infringement (which we refer to as a “weak” 
proof requirement).   
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All of the countries that we studied empower judges to exercise discretion when 
considering the issuance of preliminary injunctions. The central hallmark of such assessment is 
the balance of party interests: how the issuance or its refusal will affect the parties. Typical 
considerations include the impact of an injunctive order on the infringer’s business (e.g., closure, 
customers, or insolvency), on the business of the patentee (e.g., on its production, customers or 
ability to compete), or the likelihood that the patentee will successfully collect damages later in 
the process. While most countries use such balancing to decide upon issuance, in Poland, for 
instance, it only shapes the form and scope in which a preliminary injunction is granted. 
 
Unlike parties’ hardship, the public interest is not always explicitly mentioned in the legal 
provisions dealing with preliminary injunctions. For instance, it is not included in the statutory 
language in Finland. That being said, legal doctrines in the countries studied generally required 
assessment of the public interest. In the common law countries (UK, US, Israel, Canada), public 
interest is one of the traditional equitable factors. Similarly, major civil law jurisdictions 
(Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands) explicitly consider public interest in their decision-
making about issuance of preliminary injunctions. In Poland, also a civil law country, the public 
interest is not explicitly considered by the courts, but this seems to be an exception. 
 
Public interest factors considered by judges include issues of employment (e.g., massive 
and sudden worker layoffs), workplace safety and public health (e.g., availability of products with 
particular therapeutic properties, increased efficacy or reduced side-effects). Pure considerations 
of follow-on innovation and promotion of competition are usually not sufficient to demonstrate a 
public interest in favor of injunctions. Nevertheless,  courts in some U.S. cases13 have considered 
the public interest in the reliable enforcement of patent rights, bringing public interest factors into 
play in favor of the issuance of injunctions. While employment considerations alone would 
typically be insufficient to overcome a request for a  final injunction, these considerations may be 
given stronger consideration in the earlier stages (preliminary injunctions and stays pending 
appeal). In Germany, the courts previously considered issues such as the patent holder’s ability to 
satisfy domestic market needs, improvement of trade balance, or improvement of the currency 
situation as being covered by the public interest. The net effect of these considerations is that 
public interest factors usually weigh against the entry of a preliminary injunction.   
 
Interestingly, the degree of discretion that courts enjoy with respect to preliminary 
injunctions may, as a practical matter, lessen the need for discretion in permanent injunction cases. 
That is, the delay and scope of inquiry around preliminary injunctions sometimes act as hidden 
‘flexibilities’ of the system. For instance, if the discretion is exercised appropriately on the 
preliminary and/or stay pending appeal stage, the need for further delays in granting a final 
injunction might be low, especially if the procedure took years to complete. By the time the final 
injunction is entered, the patents may have expired, or, at a minimum, the prudent infringer would 
 
13 See, e.g., Apple (Fed. Cir. 2015, p. 647) (“the public interest nearly always weighs in favor of protecting 
property rights in the absence of countervailing factors, especially when the patentee practices his inventions.”).  See 
discussion in Contreras 2019, 3; 11-12. 
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B. Content of Injunction Orders 
In addition to the processes for determining whether or not an injunction will issue in a 
particular case, variations exist among courts and jurisdictions with respect to the specific language 
and terms of injunctions that are issued. The language of injunctions appears to be influenced both 
by doctrinal rules in a jurisdiction as well as its legal norms and customs.  
 
1.  Tailoring the scope of injunctions 
 
In most of the studied common law countries (US, UK, Canada, Israel), judges are more 
proactive in drafting their injunction orders, and enjoy considerable discretion in doing so. These 
judges are more likely to invite parties to participate in drafting the wording of injunction orders 
or to draft their orders from scratch. In Canada, for instance, the judge may either require the 
parties to jointly draft the proposed order, or write it herself and ask the parties to make notes and 
comments, before issuing it.  
 
In the civil law countries (Germany, France, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland), the 
plaintiffs largely pre-determine the scope of court orders, and judges can only narrow them, 
including by reformulating. Hence, they act more as moderators of the proposals of plaintiffs. The 
process of drafting injunctions is generally less iterative in civil law countries than common law 
countries.  
 
Varying the discretion of judges, however, does not seem to translate into a shared practice 
regarding the breadth of resulting orders. We generally observe a spectrum, where on one hand, 
the judges in some countries issue mere “do not infringe” orders, specifying only the patents 
infringed (Canada, United Kingdom, Israel, the Netherlands), while judges in other countries tend 
to specify products or processes along with infringing acts (Italy, Germany, Finland, France, 
United States).  
 
Some of the countries in which more narrowly worded injunctions are issued sometimes 
allow enforcement of injunctions beyond their literal wording. For instance, in Germany, the 
infringer cannot evade an injunction by making minor changes to the infringing act/product if the 
core of the infringement remains unchanged. In Italy, minor variations falling outside the “genus 
and species” of the infringement that was already ascertained by the court, would also be 
insufficient to escape the effects of an injunction. On the other hand, in the United States, orders 
might explicitly envision such equivalent infringements as variations of “no more than colorably 
different” infringements in addition to those specified in orders.  
 
 
14 Lemley & Shapiro 2007, 2005 (“The downstream firm cannot adopt a strategy of "redesign only if the patent 
is valid" without exposing itself to holdup if the patent is valid.”) 
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At the same time, even countries that primarily rely on broader wording of orders 
sometimes adopt strategies to narrow them or clarify their goals. For instance, judges might 
accompany broad orders with narrower language specifying products and conduct that are enjoined 
(Canada), or specifying only the conduct that is enjoined (Israel). In some countries, broad wording 
of injunctions may eventually be construed more narrowly in light of the court’s reasoning (the 
Netherlands). In the United Kingdom, judges may substitute a default broad form for orders for a 
form that is more specific if justified by the circumstances of the case. In some countries, 
prohibitions on indirect infringement and importation are accompanied by more specific orders, 
as non-infringing activities may be involved in such activities.  
 
Thus, whatever the standard for issuing injunctions in a particular jurisdiction, the scope 
of injunctive orders seems to reflect some balance between effective protection of patent holders 
on one hand, and infringers’ right to conduct business, on the other. The overarching goal of all 
such orders is that infringers not be able to avoid the effect of such orders. It is commonly feared 
that overly narrow orders could make enforcement onerous for plaintiffs, as they would need to 
initiate new litigation for each infringing act not covered by the scope of such narrow orders. On 
the other hand, as emphasized by the Polish courts, overly broad injunctions can disproportionately 
limit the rights of infringers by preventing them from taking actions that are not actually infringing. 
In the United Kingdom, courts will consider the intent of infringers when calibrating the scope of 
injunctive orders. Similar considerations are present in the Italian literature. 
 
The balance struck by different courts across jurisdictions seems to depend on the broader 
institutional set-up, in particular the availability of an effective procedure to clarify injunctions 
over time. In some countries, if questions about the scope of an injunction arise, infringers can 
seek declarations of non-infringement from a court (e.g., Netherlands and UK). In these models, 
by default, the costs of clarification and the burden of proof are borne by the infringer. However, 
different institutional concerns exist in other countries. In Finland, for instance, judges strive for 
narrow orders because non-specialist institutions such as the District Bailiff are responsible for 
subsequent enforcement. The judiciary therefore aims to streamline enforcement as much as 
possible.  
 
The timeline of injunctive orders is determined by not only a country’s attitude toward 
flexibility in orders for final injunctive relief, but also the availability of preliminary injunctions, 
its treatment of stays pending appeal, and eventual enforcement. At each of these stages, additional 
delays may be introduced. Judges therefore consider the temporal effects of their decisions beyond 
the actual wording of orders, and in some cases the infringer might have ample time to adapt its 
operations prior to a final decision on the merits. 
 
2.  The range of tailoring approaches to injunctive orders 
 
At its core, every effort to calibrate the wording of injunction orders is a type of judicial 
tailoring. For example, mentioning a specific patent or infringing product in an order distinguishes 
it on a factual basis from other orders. However, there are some tailoring practices that highlight 
how tailoring can specifically accommodate private and public interests. The country chapters 
describe several such more advanced types of tailoring: (1) sell-off periods, (2) delays, and (3) 
additional carve-outs. Notably, each of these types of tailoring derogates from an injunction’s 
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otherwise absolute prohibition on the manufacturing and sale of infringing goods – it allows 
limited infringing activity for the purpose of accommodating reasonable party and public needs.   
 
Sell-off periods are used to allow the infringer to finish distribution of products that were 
already produced at the time an injunction is entered, or for which orders were place by the third 
parties. Such sell-off period seek to prevent disruption in the distribution of products to the market, 
particularly when there is a public need for such products (e.g., medical products or drugs).  
 
Delays in the effectiveness of an injunction can, in addition to permitting selling off 
inventory, allow an infringer to invent-around the infringed patent.15 In some cases, delays in 
effectiveness are imposed for the benefit of third parties, such as patients, where immediate 
enforcement could disrupt the functioning of some important public resources (e.g., use of new 
heart valves requires re-training of the surgeons or adjustment of hospital procedures).16 It could 
also mitigate the effects of an injunction on critical infrastructure, such as sewage systems or 
telecommunication networks, which affect the population at large. 
 
Finally, carve-outs often complement the above types of tailoring. They might temporarily 
exempt the infringer from supplying the infringing product to a group of patients for whom there 
is currently no non-infringing alternative,17 exclude the use of a product by existing consumer 
users, or simply include conditions on new sales, such as obligations to provide additional 
information to customers.18 Apart from individual-oriented carve-outs, one can also imagine 
geographical carve-outs, e.g., during epidemics, natural catastrophes, or extreme weather. 
 
3.  Compensation by Infringers 
 
As noted in Part 2 above, some means of tailoring injunctive relief permit the infringer to 
continue to infringe for limited periods of time or with respect to limited quantities of products.  
When an injunction is denied entirely, the infringement may continue indefinitely.  Different 
jurisdictions have considered whether, and to what degree, the infringer must compensate the 
patent holder for the right to engage in these infringing activities. 
 
When an injunction is denied in the United States after a finding of infringement, the 
infringer may be required to pay the patent holder ongoing royalties, as though operating under a 
license from the patent holder. The amount of such ongoing royalties may be determined by the 
court (often by a jury) or may be negotiated by the parties.  An ongoing royalty may not be ordered 
if the patent holder was awarded lump sum damages to compensate it for all past and future harm 
associated with the infringement during the patent term. 
 
15 In the U.S., the Federal Circuit in Broadcom Corp (Fed. Cir. 2008) affirmed the district court decision to delay 
the effectiveness of permanent injunctive relief by a period of up to 20 months due to the party hardship and public 
interest. 
16 See Edwards Lifesciences LLC ([2018] EWHC 1256 (Pat)) – discussed in Chapter 13 (UK). 
17 See Edwards Lifesciences LLC ([2018] EWHC 1256 (Pat)) – Chapter 13 (UK); AbbVie (FC 2014) – discussed 
in Chapter 5 (Canada). 
18 See AbbVie (FC 2014) – Chapter 5 (Canada). 
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In Canada, the court in Unilever denied an injunction (on the basis that the patent holder 
had no operations in Canada) and in lieu thereof awarded “a generous, but non-confiscatory, rate 
of royalty”, which was somewhat higher than a reasonable royalty. The court reasoned that the 
enhancement was given in exchange for the avoidance of an injunction.19  
 
Though there is no English patent case to date in which damages have been assessed in lieu 
of an injunction, it appears that calculation of such damages would follow the criteria for ordinary 
damages for patent infringement. That is, they would be calculated as lost profits, lost licensing 
fees or a reasonable royalty that the parties would have agreed in comparable cases. Disgorgement 
of the infringer’s profits does not seem to be available in such cases.  
 
Article 12 of EU Directive 2004/48 permits the courts of Member States to order monetary 
compensation in lieu of an injunction. Though optional, Poland implemented this provision in 
Article 287 Section 3 of the Polish Industrial Property Law. It provides that a court may, upon the 
motion of the infringer, order the payment of monetary compensation in lieu of an injunction. This 
is possible however only when the infringer acted unintentionally and without negligence, the 
issuance of an injunction would disproportionately harm the infringer, and monetary compensation 
would be satisfactory to the patentee. Despite the existence of this statutory provision, it has never 
been exercised with respect to any patent or other intellectual property case. 
 
Sell-off exceptions, as discussed above, permit ongoing infringement with respect to the 
sale of existing units of an infringing product. In some cases, damages may have been assessed 
with respect to the manufacture of such infringing products, in which case additional royalties 
should not be due with respect to their subsequent sale.  Thus, sell-off exceptions are usually 
granted without an obligation by the infringer to compensate the patent holder further. 
Nevertheless, examples exist in which courts have required compensation by the infringer selling 
off infringing inventory (Canada). Similarly, in Finland, owners of infringing products can be 
allowed by a court to continue to use such products if they pay compensation.20 European law also 
foresees the opposite scenario, namely that patent holders are asked to shoulder the cost of ancillary 
orders, such as those requiring the infringer to destroy or recall infringing products.21 
 
4.  Enforcement of injunctions 
 
The countries studied generally employ a mix of approaches to the enforcement of 
injunctions. Usually, enforcement mechanisms combine monetary liability (fines, damages, and 
penalties) and criminal penalties. This is the case in Germany, Canada, Israel, Italy, Poland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. In the United States, an infringer’s failure to comply with 
the terms of an injunctive order can result in a finding of “contempt of court”, which can be a 
criminal offense, and might result in criminal penalties such as imprisonment, as well as a new 
 
19Unilever (FCTD 1993, p.571). 
20 Interestingly enough, the compatibility with EU law is supported by Article 12 of the Enforcement Directive – 
See Chapter 4 (EU). 
21 See Article 10(2) of the Enforcement Directive. 
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injunction that is more burdensome. Other countries (Finland, France and the Netherlands), 
however, only rely on monetary tools to enforce injunctions. Automatic non-compliance fines are 
more typical for civil law jurisdictions (the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, France, and Finland). For 
instance, in France, the courts use penalties, which they can impose even ex officio. Such penalties 
are often independent of damages and cannot be credited against damages otherwise owed by the 
infringer. 
 
In the enforcement stage, the effect of an infringer’s knowledge and intent to violate an 
order is not assessed uniformly. While some countries only sanction culpable (Germany), willful 
(United States) or intentional (Italy) non-compliance, other countries do not take a party’s intent 
into account (United Kingdom). In the United Kingdom, the defendant’s intention (or lack of it) is 
generally relevant only to the sanction, but the court can dismiss disproportionate reactions to 
trivial or blameless breaches of an order.  
 
 
C. Institutional Factors 
It has already been noted that institutional factors influence the exercise of flexibility both 
in granting injunctive relief and also in fashioning the terms of injunctions. Most notably, the belief 
of judges in countries such as Germany that compulsory licensing can resolve public interest issues 
leads them to adopt a certain kind of ‘public interest bifurcation’. Thus, the public interest is 
generally set aside when deciding individual cases because the law is construed to create a separate 
procedure for its evaluation.  
 
Somewhat related to this are rules in some countries that immunize the government and its 
suppliers from injunctions for patent infringement (United Kingdom (the Crown), France (for 
national defense), United States (sovereign immunity for federal and state governments)). In 
countries such as the United States, sovereign immunity is a Constitutional principle that applies 
to all claims made against the government.  State governments are wholly immune from patent 
infringement as such claims may be heard only in federal courts, and states may not be sued in 
federal court without their consent under the 11th Amendment to the Constitution. The federal 
government is likewise immune from claims brought in its own (federal) courts, though by statute 
(28 U.S.C. § 1498) the federal government has waived its (and its contractors’) sovereign 
immunity for patent infringement claims and permits claims for monetary relief to be brought 
against it in the specialized Court of Claims. However, no injunction may issue against the federal 
government or its contractors in such cases.  
 
This injunction immunity might provide another type of ‘public interest bifurcation’, as it 
suggests that the legislature has already considered issues of public interest in immunizing 
governmental bodies from such injunctions. Although such immunity does not appear common 
among civil law countries, it may be supplemented de facto by compulsory licensing rules, which 
in some cases are drafted particularly with governmental use in mind. The idea behind such a two-
tier system could be explained by the expectation that enjoining actions of public authorities, as 
opposed to private actors, is more likely to raise public interest concerns. For instance, enjoining 
fire departments, police corps, military, or public health authorities from using inventions in course 
of their public activities appears prima facie more problematic than stopping exploitation by 
private firms of patents covering typical commercial products or services. 
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Specifically, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Canada, which do not recognize 
sovereign immunity for patent claims, allow their governments to obtain compulsory licenses 
under patent rights. Several countries also permit private parties, in addition to governmental 
entities, to seek compulsory licenses under patent rights under specified conditions. However, 
several countries, including Germany, report that such compulsory licenses must be applied for 
specifically and cannot be raised as defenses in an infringement proceeding (Finland, Germany 
and the Netherlands). Nevertheless, compulsory licenses are reported to be very rarely issued. 
Therefore, even though some countries that favor an automatic approach to injunctions do have 
compulsory licensing provisions, they are not often applied in practice, and are not very well 
integrated with infringement proceedings.  
 
This observation implies that jurisdictions that justify their inflexibility in issuing 
injunctions by pointing to the availability of compulsory licenses may be relying on a false 
equivalency. If alleged infringers cannot reasonably rely on the availability of compulsory 
licenses, they cannot be said to be particularly useful to defend the public interest. Moreover, under 
such a system, the defense of the public interest is left to the initiative of one of the parties, which 
may not always be effective or in the best interest of the public. Improving the integration of 
compulsory licensing procedures into infringement proceedings represents a possible, albeit 
limited, solution to the general problem of considering the public interest. 
 
Another institutional feature that prominently affects the issuance and tailoring of 
injunctions is a court’s assessment of patent validity and prevailing assumptions about the overall 
quality of patents in the jurisdiction. If judges believe that the quality of patents is generally high 
in their jurisdiction, they may presume more strongly that a patentee’s argument is likely to prevail. 
These presumptions impact the availability of preliminary injunctions and possibly stays of 
enforcement. If the institutional set up of a country strengthens this presumption further by 
bifurcating the infringement and validity portions of a proceeding (Germany and Poland), this 
might also increase the likelihood of final injunctions.  
 
A stronger presumption in favor of granting injunctions might also result from a country’s 
reliance on a non-specialized judiciary, which may be unwilling to question underlying patents 
because it is intimidated by their technological aspects. During our workshops, it was suggested 
that in some countries with a specialized judiciary and patent bar (e.g., the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom), one can observe more professional self-restraint in enforcing the rights of their 
clients. That is, counsel exhibiting self-restraint are more likely to request reasonable remedies, 
rather than seeking maximal penalties. Such self-restraint would then result in the issuance of more 
balanced decisions by judges. However, in the United States, professionalization may have the 
opposite effect, with a specialized patent bar and judiciary leading to a greater number of pro-
patent holder decisions as well as rules favoring patent holders.22  
 
22 See, e.g., Jaffe & Lerner 2004, 168 (“the failure of federal efforts to reform the patent system is due to several 
factors: … (2) the people with the greatest economic stake in retaining a litigious and complex patent system – the 
patent bar – have proven to be a very powerful lobby”); Holte & Seaman 2017, 145 (finding support for the claim that 
“the Federal Circuit, as a specialized court with a large number of patent cases, is more pro-patentee than the generalist 
district courts”). 
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Naturally, there are a number of additional institutional factors that might influence what 
we observe in the case law. In particular, legal fees and private costs, the existence of cost shifting 
schemes, the likelihood of settlements and the average length of proceedings, all further influence 
litigation outcomes. For instance, according to one empirical study, German litigants settle 60 % 
of patent cases – which is a disproportionately high rate when compared to other jurisdictions (e.g., 
the settlement rate in the UK is 35%).23 In the U.S., commentators routinely report that the “the 
vast majority of patent cases settle before trial.”24 Settlement agreements often include cease and 
desist obligations that otherwise would have been adjudicated by the courts. Therefore the fact that 
we do not observe nuanced tailoring in the case law does not necessarily mean that it is not taking 
place in the market. In fact, one could argue that such agreements are exactly where such tailoring 
takes place. Furthermore, some empirical research suggests that German patent courts engage in 
forum selling by attracting cases through the pro-plaintiff stance of refusals to stay patent 
infringement proceedings when a patent’s validity is being challenged.25  
 
Another institutional factor that can affect the frequency and scope of injunctions is the 
cost of litigation. In the UK, for example, comparatively high costs of litigation, coupled with fee 
shifting rules and high patent invalidation rates, may limit the number of non-practicing entities 
(NPEs) invoking their rights in the jurisdiction.26 As a result, courts in the UK may have less 
occasion to consider cases involving NPEs than, say, courts in the U.S., in which fee shifting is 
rare. 
 
To conclude, patent litigation is influenced by a range of systemic factors, and the degree 
of flexibility and tailoring of injunctive relief in a particular jurisdiction cannot be assessed simply 
by looking at absolute numbers of decided cases. Sometimes, tailoring may occur before judges 
make final decisions, either because of built-in delays in the litigation process or settlements. 
Sometimes other features of the system, such as compulsory licensing, immunities, and legal costs, 
appear to address public and party interests. However, none of these institutional features is perfect 
or applied uniformly, meaning that there will always be a group of cases that require some form 
of fine-tuning at the remedial stage. 
 
 
II. ASSESSING SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES AND OUTCOMES 
 
A.  Tailoring and Refusal 
Judges have two main strategies for giving effect to party interests and public interests 
when assessing injunctions, while at the same time minimizing encroachments on patent rights: 
(1) to use discretion in deciding which injunctions to grant and deny, and (2) to tailor final 
 
23 Cremers, Ernicke, Harhoff, Helmers, Licht, McDonagh, Rudyk, Schliessler, Schneider & van Zeebroeck 
(2016). 
24 See, e.g., Lemley, Kendall & Martin 2013, 171. 
25 See Bechtold, Frankenreiter, and Klerman 2019. 
26 McDonagh 2016, 30 (studying cases through 2015). 
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injunctions by allowing delays in effectiveness, sell-off periods or carve-outs.27 The denial of 
injunctions, which is often emphasized in policy discussions, seems to be relevant only if tailoring 
does not offer satisfactory solutions for party or public interests. 
 
Looking at the case law across jurisdictions, we observe that the majority of countries we 
studied engage in some type of tailoring of injunctive relief – often by introducing delays or sell-
off periods in at least some cases.28 While in other countries tailoring is theoretically possible, 
there is limited or no case law directly on point. The denial of injunctions after a finding of patent 
infringement is, except in the United States, very rare.29 Table 2 below summarizes notable cases 




The most established practice exists in the U.S., where courts assess the appropriateness of 
injunctions on a case by case basis and have denied injunctive relief when the factors established 
in eBay v. MercExchange are not satisfied. Apart from the U.S., UK courts, despite limited case 
law, most strongly signal the possibility that injunctive relief may be denied. Edwards v Boston30 
shows that such refusal can be also limited to only a sub-set of infringing actions or be limited in 
time. In a case involving standards-essential patents, Unwired Planet v Huawei,31, an English court 
issued a conditional injunction, which would enter into force only if the infringer did not enter into 
a license with the patent holder on terms prescribed by the court. Lastly, there is a single Canadian 
case that rejects injunctive relief, in part on the ground that the patentees did not practise their 
patented invention in Canada.  
 
B.  Discretion and Proportionality 
Judicial discretion, in the common law countries, and proportionality, in the EU countries, 
are both types of case-by-case assessment. They might differ in details and the factors that they 
involve, but ultimately they attempt to deliver individualized justice. This is best seen in the 
 
27 This latter group has been referred to as tailoring of “scope or timing”. Siebrasse et al. 2019, 155. 
28 See also id. (eliminating existing products from the scope of an injunction has been “occasionally applied or at 
least considered by courts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.”). 
29 Following the framework set forth by the CEJU in Huawei v. ZTE [C-170/13], courts in Europe may refuse to 
grant patent injunctions on the basis of competition law when asserted patents are subject to licensing commitments 
on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms. See Larouche & Zingales 2017, 406. 
30 Edwards Life Sciences LLC (No 3) [2018] EWHC 1256 (Pat). 
31 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat). 
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English case law, where both of these types of assessment overlap, but often point in the same 
direction. The combined test developed by Lord Justice Arnold in HTC v Nokia blends the two 
approaches as follows:32  
 
Article 3(2) does not merely require that remedies for infringement should be proportionate 
and avoid creating barriers to legitimate trade, it also requires that they should be effective 
and dissuasive. As the jurisprudence of the English courts summarised above recognises, 
the effect of refusing an injunction to restrain future infringement is, to that extent, to 
deprive the claimant of its legal right. That is particularly true in the case of patents, which 
are monopolies and thus the essence of the right is the patentee's right to give or withhold 
his consent to another person's exploitation of the patented invention. Thus the grant of 
damages in lieu of an injunction is inevitably less effective and dissuasive than the grant 
of an injunction. (..) Where the right sought to be enforced by the injunction is a patent, 
however, the court must be very cautious before making an order which is tantamount to a 
compulsory licence in circumstances where no compulsory licence would be available. It 
follows that, where no other countervailing right is in play, the burden on the party seeking 
to show that the injunction would be disproportionate is a heavy one. 
 
From the contributions to this book, it is clear that some judges in common law countries, 
in particular Israel, share this starting point when exercising their discretion.  
 
As shown above, the greatest degree of judicial discretion in terms of issuing injunctions 
is observed in the United States. This result is usually explained by reference to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s eBay decision in 2006. But eBay did not emerge in a vacuum.  It could be argued that the 
instrumentalist purpose of patent law established by the U.S. Constitution itself allows U.S. courts 
to question the normative goals of the patent system, and the remedies that should be available to 
patent holders, more deeply than is permitted to courts in other countries, including other common 
law countries.33  That is, unlike countries in which patents fall under the umbrella of Constitutional 
principles that protect private interests in property, the U.S. Supreme Court has conceptualized 
patents as “government franchises” rather than traditional property rights.34 Accordingly, in 
deciding eBay, the U.S. Supreme Court was not constrained by strong Constitutional property 
principles that may limit the authority of courts in other countries to exercise significant discretion 
in deciding whether or not to grant injunctions in patent cases. In the European Union, judges 
might be warier of the fact that the legislature’s decision to protect an invention through an 
exclusive right implies that any denial of an injunction would be taking away the ‘essence’ of the 
patent right.35 
 
32 HTC Corporation [2013] EWHC 3778 (Pat), paras 28, 32. 
33 Canada also takes an instrumentalist view of patent law, and the Canadian Patent Act states that “the object of 
the Patent Act is to promote the development of inventions in a manner that benefits both the inventor and the public.” 
Nevertheless, with respect to injunctions, Canada falls into Group A, giving its judges little discretion not to issue 
injunctions. 
34 Oil States Energy Services (2018).     
35 On the notion of essence of intellectual property rights under the EU Charter, see Husovec 2019, 843. For 
instance, Advocate General Wathelet hints at this in his Opinion in Huawei v ZTE Case C-170/13 at fn. 34 (‘[t]he 
essential objective of a patent is to ensure, in order to reward the creative effort of the inventor, that the owner of the 
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Significantly, the European proportionality test, which addresses both party interests and 
public interests does include a test relating to the adequacy of monetary relief to the patent holder. 
As illustrated by the passage above, reference to effectiveness and dissuasiveness is, on the 
contrary, generally understood to highlight the property rationale of patents. From this perspective, 
it is understandable that European judges do not make the same normative choices, and give much 
more deference to the legislative authority vested in patents. The proportionality test, as outlined 
by the case-law of the CJEU (see Chapter 4 (EU)), therefore acts as a marginal corrective on the 
real-world effects of patent enforcement rather than a last-resort corrective on the entire patent 
system. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (EU), Recital 17 of the EU Enforcement Directive frames 
proportionality considerations as ‘tak[ing] into account the specific characteristics of the case, 
including the specific features of each intellectual property right and, where appropriate, the 
intentional or unintentional character of the infringement’. Art. 3(2) provides that ‘measures, 
procedure and remedies’ used to address the infringement of intellectual property rights must be 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ to ensure their enforcement.  
 
Though the Enforcement Directive includes a specific optional provision on damages in 
lieu of injunctions, its impact on national law appears to be insignificant at this point. Article 12 
of the Enforcement Directive, which is limited to party interest grounds and does not include the 
public interest element, has not been explicitly implemented in Germany (for patent cases), 
Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom. In fact, even Poland, which has 
implemented it, has not applied it in an IP case. While authors from many of these countries do 
not dismiss the possibility of refusal of an injunction based on the Enforcement Directive’s concept 
of proportionality, there is no case law showing that this is a practical possibility. Usually, the only 
such case law deals with FRAND disputes, drawing on the limits outlined by competition law.  
 
It is notable that the approach of group A countries, which are mostly EU civil law 
countries, has generally been different with respect to more ancillary orders, such as those relating 
to destruction and recall of infringing products. These orders are more particularly regulated by 
the EU law, which explicitly requires that judges always assess ‘the need for proportionality 
between the seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of 
third parties shall be taken into account’ (Article 10, EU Enforcement Directive). Thus for these 
specific ancillary orders it is not uncommon to see refusals, or qualifications, by judges. 
 
The general situation described above contrasts starkly with current interpretations of the 
Enforcement Directive by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). As summarized in 
Chapter 4, ‘[the Enforcement Directive] allows and even requires the denial or flexible curtailing 
of injunctive relief in certain exceptional cases where an untailored injunction would be grossly 
disproportionate, it does not contain any bright-line rules for certain entire case groups’.36 As noted 
there, even the test outlined in cases concerning injunctions against intermediaries ‘clearly has an 
 
patent has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and selling them, 
either directly, or by granting licences to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements’). 
36 See Chapter 4 (EU). 
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impact on the general question of how to consider and balance the fundamental rights of the parties 
when applying and specifying injunctions’.37 Even if the Member States implemented Article 12 
of the Enforcement Directive more broadly (damages in lieu of injunctions), the provision remains 
conceptually plagued by uncertainties around its scope. In particular, as pointed out in Chapter 4,38 
without an authoritative clarification by the CJEU that for the purposes of assessment of the 
“innocence” of an infringement only the initial act is relevant, the provision is unlikely to have any 
practical use.39 
 
For these reasons, even if the European courts more fully embrace proportionality in patent 
law,40 which they have not done yet, the set of cases that is likely to be considered under the test 
is much narrower than in the U.S. Although European judges have some experience using 
proportionality for purposes of preliminary injunctions, the interests that they are likely to consider 
for purposes of final injunctions are more limited. For instance, as suggested in some of the 
contributions to this book, considerations of employment and follow-on innovation have a smaller 
role to play under a European proportionality analysis. The reason is not ignorance of these issues, 
but stronger judicial deference to the legislative design of the patent law. While at the preliminary 
stage European judges may try to find a good interim solution in the midst of significant legal 
uncertainty, in the final stage, when the legal situation is clarified, they feel the need to give full 
force to the legislator’s design. The proportionality test asks them to correct it only at the margin 
and only as far as a ‘countervailing right is in play’.41  
 
C.  International context 
 
International law does not seem to play a major role in tailoring and granting injunctive 
relief in any of the studied countries. This is in line with the findings of the authors of Chapter 2, 
who argue that the injunction provisions of the TRIPS Agreement only provide authority to grant 
injunctions, without significantly constraining the exercise of that authority. They point to the 
analogous setting of the WTO China—Enforcement panel decision, which held that another 
similarly worded provision of TRIPS provides “the obligation is to ‘have’ authority, [it is] not an 
obligation to ‘exercise’ authority.”42 At the same time, they highlight that the interaction of TRIPS 
provisions on injunctive relief and compulsory licensing can be become quite complex, depending 
on the reading that is adopted by the WTO. Nevertheless, the chapter authors, along with other 
 
37 See Chapter 4 (EU) 
38 See Chapter 4 (EU) 
39 It is worth noting that the very idea of an “innocent” patent infringement does not exist in many jurisdictions. 
40 Some commentators (including JLC) have recommended that courts in Europe more fully adopt principles of 
proportionality in assessing injunctive relief. Siebrasse et al., supra note 27, at 155 (“we recommend that a 
proportionality-based test … de deployed in a system that gives courts latitude to construct injunctions that are tailored 
to avoid or mitigate disproportionate effects”). 
41 HTC Corp v Nokia Corp (No 2) [2013] EWHC 3778 (Pat), para 28. 
42 China—Enforcement, at ¶ 7.236.  Article 59 requires that “competent authorities shall have the authority to 
order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods . . .”.  See TRIPS, art. 59. 
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scholars, argue that even the flexible U.S. approach to injunctive relief would very likely be 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement.43 
 
This being said, two other types of limitations that might arise under international law, 
which are less often appreciated in policy debates. First, they explain that domestic practices 
around the exercise of authority to grant injunctive relief also need to be consistent with the 
requirements of national or most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. They highlight that de facto 
discrimination may thus constitute a violation of TRIPS under some circumstances, for instance 
when it constitutes a clear feature of the system’s design. This could be particularly relevant in 
cases in which some neutral proxy considerations, such as non-exploitation or local employment, 
lead to worse enforcement conditions for foreign patent owners. A similar problem could arise in 
the context of the TRIPS prohibition on discrimination by a field of technology. For instance, when 
a particular societal issue is being addressed by injunction flexibilities in the area of ICT but 
remains ignored in other areas of technology (e.g., pharmaceuticals), a compliance issue under the 
TRIPS Agreement could arise.  
 
Finally, a lack of flexibility at the national level could equally constitute a problem because 
the TRIPS Agreement imposes a ceiling on national enforcement measures. Specifically,  
 
• Article 7 states that the Objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are to: “contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations”.  
 
• Article 41 requires that injunctions must be “be applied in such a manner as to avoid 
the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their 
abuse” and that procedures must be “fair and equitable”, and “not [] unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.”  
 
As a result, the TRIPS chapter authors conclude that “excessive enforcement could also 
raise compliance issues”.44 However, in all of these cases, they observe that there may be a need 
to prove a pattern or practice, which emerges from domestic decisions, before one can consider 
underlying compliance with TRIPS obligations. 
 
D.  Trends and Future Directions 
Many of the contributors to this book noted clear or subtle trends in their jurisdictions, 
indicating that there might be changes on the horizon. The first and most obvious catalyst of change 
is U.S. judicial practice, which contrasts considerably with that of countries having  a strong 
presumption favoring the issuance of permanent injunctions. A second catalyst may be 
technological change, which has resulted in increasingly complex technological products, creating 
more situations in which simple binary decisions regarding injunctions are difficult to justify in 
 
43 See Chapter 2 (TRIPS). 
44 Chapter 2 (TRIPS). 
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light of other interests.45 A third catalyst, at least in the European Union, is EU law itself, which 
increasingly emphasizes proportionality, which can incorporate considerations of both party 
interest and the public interest.  
 
Equally powerful in re-imagining existing approaches to injunctive relief is EU 
competition law, which has prominently been invoked in FRAND disputes and has directly 
impacted the remedial toolkit of patent law. Surprisingly, EU competition law has been more 
successful than the EU Enforcement Directive in influencing European judges regarding the 
issuance of injunctions. This may be because competition law solutions are more circumscribed 
than those based on patent law.46 That is, patent law solutions are often applicable to all patent 
owners, but competition law solutions are applicable only to a subset of patent owners in a position 
of dominance. Therefore, there is less worry that any particular decision will have substantial 
spillover effects. More broadly, it should be emphasized that the EU legislature has limited power 
to influence other policy layers of the patent system, such as patent quality and scope of rights, 
which remain outside of EU law.47 
 
A number of our European contributors have advocated for greater judicial reliance on the 
proportionality test in the assessment of injunctions, noting that the literature is sometimes not 
fully reflected in the case law.48 Interestingly, European contributors emphasize that other IP 
domains, in particular copyright law, are more advanced in this respect. There, apparently, 
internalization of the CJEU’s doctrines seems to be in full swing at the domestic level. For 
example, in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has held in a copyright infringement 
case that when an injunction is requested, ‘a specific balancing of interests, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case’ must be performed.49  
 
The theory that the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be balanced against 
other fundamental rights (perhaps relating to health or education) could have an impact on 
injunctions in patent cases too.50  However, patent judges seem reluctant to extend fundamental 
rights-inspired balancing to patent law. Usually, they remain convinced that most of the time there 
is nothing to balance in patent law. In Germany, this attitude has prompted a reaction by the 
legislature, which recently proposed an amendment to the patent law that would require courts to 
consider party interests and the public interest in the analysis of injunctive relief. The envisaged 
 
45 See Siebrasse et al. 2019, 156 (recommending “that courts generally be willing to consider such tailoring 
whenever injunctive relief is sought in relation to a complex product”), Sikorski 2019, 246 (“Comparison of the harm 
and the elusive benefits of an injunction [for infringing a component of a complex product] would strongly favor 
monetary compensation in lieu of an injunction or at least tailoring of injunctive relief that would allow for designing 
around while allowing the manufacturer to stay on the market for the time necessary to switch to a new technology”). 
46 See Husovec 2020 (discussing the use of proportionality in EU patent law). 
47 The principal body that assesses questions of patentability in the EU is the European Patent Office (EPO), an 
arm of the European Patent Organisation, an international treaty organisation with 38 member states.   
48 See also Siebrasse et al. 2019, 155-56 (recommending greater reliance on proportionality principle). 
49 Anne Frank Stichting (CoA Amsterdam 2018, para. 3.11.2) – for the discussion, see Chapter 11 (Netherlands). 
50 See Sikorski 2019, 247 (public interest concerns justify tailoring of injunctive relief). 
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introduction of an explicit proportionality requirement for injunctions links financial compensation 
with any potential refusal. If adopted, it still remains to be seen how much traction the mechanism 
will gain in actual court practice and what standards of review will be adopted. 
 
This is not to say, however, that the increased use of proportionality by European judges 
will lead to results that come anywhere close to U.S. practice. As we have shown, there are many 
shades of flexibility and tailoring that judges can use to consider party and public interests. Based 
on our survey of the literature, it seems that the existing case law in European countries does not 
always match the opinions of scholars, who seem less reluctant to internalize EU case law in patent 
law.  
 
Another important development to watch in this area concerns the creation of the European 
Unitary Patent Court (UPC) system (see Chapter 4 (EU)).  This system will exist independently of 
and alongside the national legal and judicial systems studied in this volume, and will be comprised 
of judges and courts from countries across Europe, with tribunals situated in a few large 
jurisdictions.  It is unclear what institutional and structural preferences will emerge within the UPC 
system, and the degree to which these features will be influenced, or dominated, by the legal 
systems of one or more of the remaining UPC member states.   
 
The UPC system, which has not yet been created, is anticipated to grant a degree of 
discretion to its judges,51 while leaving the principles underlying the actual practice open. 
Although the Preparatory Committee expressed the view that the denial of an injunction might be 
possible only under ‘very exceptional circumstances’,52 the final rules of procedure and practice 
might differ. It is no wonder, therefore, that literature expresses contradictory views on what to 
expect from the future UPC.53 In terms of our spectrum, the UPC could easily shift between groups 
B to E, although only B to D appear likely.  
 
Interestingly, given the recent exit of the United Kingdom from the EU and the UPC 
system, UK judges, arguably Europe’s most ardent champions of proportionality in patent law and 
influential voices in the original drafting of the UPC’s rules, will no longer have a direct say in the 
new institution’s operations or the subsequent evolution of its rules. Their influence might only 
remain indirect through the interpretation of some common rules under international law, and by 
setting an example of good practices.54 After all, the principles of judicial decision making from 
 
51 See 63(1) Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (2013) Official Journal C 175, p. 1–40 (“Where a decision is 
taken finding an infringement of a patent, the Court may grant an injunction against the infringer aimed at prohibiting 
the continuation of the infringement.” – emphasis ours) 
52 ‘Table with Explanatory Notes to the Changes Made by the Legal Group of the Preparatory Committee in the 
17th Draft of the Rules of Procedure’ (2014) p.11. 
53 See Marfé et al. 2015, 187; Tilmann 2016, 545, 554; and Chapter DE, Part B, this volume. 
54 If the UK-EU trade deal is eventually adopted, the UK and the EU Member States participating in the UPC 
system will remain bound by the general principles for remedies in the IP Enforcement Directive (see Article IP.38(2) 
of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 
of the one part, and The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (2020) Official 
Journal L 444, p. 14–1462). 
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the UK, and even from non-European countries, may influence the shape of this important new 
transnational judicial institution. 
 
The predominant concern of patent judges in EU countries seems to be opening the 
floodgates to a new avenue of pleading at the remedial stage. This would explain why the reference 
to compulsory licensing, which is dealt with in a separate procedure, still holds its sway. However, 
as demonstrated by countries such as the UK, the recognition of judicial discretion in injunction 
cases need not cause major changes in the outcome of cases. As noted in Chapter 13 (UK), 
‘[a]lthough there is a reasonable volume of UK patent litigation, disputes concerning injunctions 
are relatively infrequent’. Arguably therefore, in a majority of cases, the exercise of greater judicial 
discretion will probably not lead to any large aggregate difference in outcomes.   
 
At the same time, the view of judges in some countries as mere automatons is not entirely 
accurate or fair. Courts in countries with strong presumptions favoring the issuance of permanent 
injunctions sometimes apply proportionality considerations at the preliminary injunction stage, 
when deciding stays, and when tailoring injunctive relief to the specific cases before them. This 
tradeoff between the decision to issue a permanent injunction (which may be relatively automatic) 
and the parameters around its tailoring (which may be flexible) suggest that any binary view of 
judicial approaches to injunctive relief is not warranted, and that a jurisdiction’s treatment of 
injunctive relief should be viewed on a holistic basis, taking into account not only doctrinal, but 
also normative and structural considerations. 
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